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Abstract
One  hundred  years  on  from  Korea’s  Sam-il
(March  First)  Independence  Movement,  this
article outlines a number of factors that led to
the mass mobilization of Koreans in sustained
nationwide  efforts  to  oust  the  Japanese
colonizers from the peninsula. Although much
of the pro-independence activism took place at
the grassroots  level  in  Korea,  the movement
a l s o  p r o v i d ed  a n  o ppo r t un i t y  f o r
contemporaneous  transnational  commentators
to  publicly  make  known their  disapproval  of
Japan’s  escalating imperial  expansionism and
its rigid colonial policies. In Japan, a number of
concerned observers questioned the dominant
mode of thinking at the time which pitted the
colonial  project  as  a  noble  and  altruistic
venture  that  would  “civilize”  Koreans.
Criticisms  ranged  from  a  distrust  of  the
empire’s political motivations to the economic
costs  of  running  the  colonies,  and  moral
opposition  based  on  humanitarian  grounds.
One Japanese commentator who demonstrated
solidarity with the colonized Koreans was the
art  critic  Yanagi  Sōetsu  柳宗悦  (1889–1961),
who  published  a  number  of  impassioned
appeals  in  an  effort  to  demonstrate  his
indignation  at  Japan’s  occupation  of  the
peninsula and to highlight the importance of
acknowledging  and  protecting  Korea’s  vast
repository of extraordinary visual cultures.
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2019 marks the hundredth anniversary of the
stirrings  of  a  major  watershed  in  Korean
history,  the  March  First  Movement  三一運動
(Kr. Sam-il undong; Jp. San’ichi undō), which
began with mass popular protests calling for
independence  in  Seoul  on  1  March,  1919.
These  protests  ignited  others  across  the
country that maintained momentum for over a
year, forming the earliest and most widespread
displays of Korean resistance to the Japanese
seizure  of  Korea  in  1905,  the  annexation  in
1910, and the era of colonization which lasted
until  Japan’s  defeat  in  World  War  II.  As  a
political campaign seeking the reinstatement of
Korean sovereignty, the Sam-il Movement was
not  confined  to  the  Korean  peninsula,  but
extended  to  the  diaspora  and  supporters  in
many international  locations  including Japan,
Manchuria, China, the United States, and parts
of  Europe.1  The  study  of  these  cosmopolitan
accounts  is  important  in  broadening  our
understanding  of  their  contribution  to
intellectual  exchange  on  the  movement  and
situating  modern  Korean  history  within  the
broader  global  context.  This  article  focuses
predominantly  on  expressions  of  support  for
the Koreans shown by the Japanese art critic
Yanagi  Sōetsu  柳宗悦  (1889–1961),2  who
closely watched the unfolding events in Korea
(Jp. Chōsen) in the colonial era, monitoring how
the protests affected daily life for Koreans in
the colony, and whether his peers would speak
out against the brutality of Japan’s response to
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the crisis. 
Yanagi’s interest in Korea began around 1914,
when an acquaintance living in colonial Korea,
Asakawa  Noritaka  浅川典孝  (1884–1964),
visited him at his home in Abiko (Chiba) with a
gift of a Chosŏn dynasty (1392–1910) porcelain
vessel  decorated  with  a  cobalt-painted
“autumn-grass” design. Yanagi was captivated
by  the  understated  elegance  of  the  work,
sparking an interest in Korean visual cultures
that also led him to seek out similarly rustic
handmade  wares  in  Japan.  Later,  he  would
def ine  such  wares  as  mingei  民芸  (a
contraction  of  minshūteki  kōgei  民衆的工芸,
“crafts of the people”) after he and his potter
friends  Hamada  Shōji  浜田庄司  (1894–1978),
Kawai  Kanjirō  河井寛次郎  (1890–1966),
Tomimoto Kenkichi 富本憲吉 (1886–1963) and
Bernard Leach (1887–1979) established Japan’s
Folk Crafts Movement 民芸運動 (Mingei undō)
in the mid-1920s.3
In  1916,  Yanagi  decided  to  visit  Asakawa
Noritaka  and  his  younger  brother  Asakawa
Takumi 浅川巧 (1891–1931) in Seoul (Jp. Keijō)
in  order  to  experience  Korean  culture  first
hand.  Arriving  at  the  Port  of  Pusan  on  11
August, Yanagi toured a number of locations in
the  southern  part  of  the  peninsula  before
catching the train to Seoul to spend two weeks
with the brothers. While in North Kyŏngsang
Province,  Yanagi  was  particularly  impressed
with the ancient capital of Kyŏngju (Jp. Keishū),
where  he  was  struck  by  the  beauty  and
grandeur  o f  Sŏkkuram  Gro t t o  ( J p .
Sekkutsuan).4 The grotto had been constructed
from granite blocks in the eighth century under
Unified  Silla  (668CE–935CE),  when  Korean
Buddhist art and architecture was at its zenith.
However,  when  it  was  “discovered”  by  the
Japanese  around  1910,  it  was  in  a  state  of
disrepair due to centuries of neglect under the
Neo-Confucian  governance  of  the  Chosŏn
monarchy.  Between  1913  and  1915,  the
Government-General of Korea 朝鮮総督府  (Kr.
Chosŏn  ch’ongdokpu;  Jp.  Chōsen  sōtokufu)
carried  out  its  first  restoration  project  on
Sŏkkuram.5 On his visit, however, Yanagi was
scathing  of  the  results,  complaining  that  “It
looks  less  like  a  restoration  than  a  case  of
vandalism.” In his own careful observations of
the  “eternal  masterpiece”  (ei’en  na  kessaku)
Sŏkkuram,  Yanagi  identified  in  the  central,
principal  Buddha  and  thirty-seven  relief
carvings  of  other  figures  in  the  Buddhist
pantheon  on  the  surrounding  grotto  walls  a
unique  national  aesthetic  emblematic  of  the
spirit of the Korean people.6
The  unrestored  Sŏkkuram  Grotto,  circa
1912  (Source:  Chōsen  Sōtokufu  [The
Government General of Korea], Bukkokuji
to Sekkutsuan [Pulguksa and Sŏkkuram],
1938, “Plate 22 Former View of Sekkutu-an
Cave-Temple,” n.p.)
At the time of his visit, Yanagi was part of a
group  of  educated  young  men  in  Tokyo
including Mushanokōji  Saneatsu 武者小路実篤
(1885–1976) ,  Sh iga  Naoya  志賀直哉
(1883–1971),  and  Arishima  Takeo  有島武郎
(1878–1923)  who  styled  themselves  as  the
group Shirakaba 白樺 (White Birch). The group
was formed through their  mutual  interest  in
modern Western art and literature, which the
members introduced in the 160 issues of their
eponymous journal  from 1910 to  1923.  As a
 APJ | JF 17 | 16 | 1
3
platform for the dissemination of avant-garde
ideas  celebrating  individuality  and  subjective
expression,  Shirakaba  took  a  leading  role  in
modern Japan in disseminating reproductions
of the works of artists including Paul Cézanne,
Henri Matisse, and Paul Gauguin (many for the
first time), and translations of the writings of
art  historians  and  thinkers  such  as  Julius
Meier-Graefe,  C.  Lewis  Hind,  and  Henrik
Ibsen.7 One of the individuals the group held a
particular  admiration  for  was  Leo  Tolstoy
(1828–1910),  whose  pursuit  of  individual
betterment  and  unwavering  commitment  to
liberal  humanism aligned with  the  members’
own  ideological  pursuits.  For  Yanagi,  the
discovery  of  Tolstoy  was  a  crucial  formative
influence  on  his  intellectual  development,
reinforcing his resolve (from around 1908) to
distance himself from his youthful defense of
militarism.8 
After  the  outbreak  of  the  Sam-il  protests,
Yanagi was among the first public intellectuals
in  Japan  to  openly  state  his  anger  at  the
entrenched view of Korean society and culture
propagated by colonial apologists as backward
and impoverished. Horrified by the swift and
brutal  nature  of  Japan’s  response  to  the
protesters—and what he perceived as a lack of
condemnation of Japan’s actions in its newest
colony—Yanagi  began  publishing  prolifically
about Korea in various newspapers and high-
profile  journals,  framing  his  petitions  for
Japan’s withdrawal from the peninsula and the
return  of  Korean  sovereignty  around  his
expressions of  empathy for  colonial  Koreans,
his admiration for Korean art, and his concern
for  the  preservation  of  the  country’s  visual
cultures.9
In Korea, the anti-colonial struggle had begun
to  take  shape  as  pro-independence  agitators
were  galvanized  by  national  historians  and
social  activists  such  as  Sin  Ch’aeho  申采浩
(1880–1936). Sin was among the first Korean
intellectuals to portray Korea’s past in terms of
a nationalist historiography (Kr. minjok sahak).
His  work,  which  traced  strong  ethnic  links
between  Koreans  and  Manchurians  in  the
ancient  Kingdom of  Puyŏ,  rejected  both  the
imposition of China’s historical suzerainty over
Korea  and  Japan’s  contemporary  claims  of
authority in the peninsula.10 In 1907, Sin played
a  seminal  role  in  the  formation  of  the
clandestine nationalist organization Sinminhoe
新民会  (New  People’s  Association),  before
leaving  the  country  just  before  the  formal
annexation in 1910, to continue his nationalist
activities abroad.11
The outbreak of the protests in Seoul in 1919
can  be  attributed  to  a  number  of  factors
feeding  public  resistance  to  the  Japanese
colonization of the country and grievances with
the  colonial  administration.  Foremost  among
these, Koreans opposed the harsh conditions of
the first decade of authoritarian “military rule”
(Jp. budan seiji) adopted by the colony’s first
governors,  Terauchi  Masatake  寺内正毅  (g.
1910–1916) and Hasegawa Yoshimichi 長谷川好
道 (g. 1916–1919). The assimilationist program
inaugurated under their guidance was designed
to educate Koreans in Japanese ways, and was
proclaimed  as  a  philanthropic  mission  that
amounted to “the spread of civilization.”12 The
authorities believed that the racial and cultural
similarities shared by the two peoples would
ensure  the  success  o f  the  Koreans ’
incorporation  into  the  Japanese  empire.  In
reality, however, this “inclusion” in empire was
only  nominal,  as  colonial  subjects  were  not
afforded the same rights as Japanese nationals,
and Korean culture was largely disparaged or
ignored.13
Outside the colony, international events such as
the 1917 dismantling of the Tsarist autocracy
in the Russian Revolution, and the participation
of  Korean  independence  activists  living  in
China  at  the  World  Conference  of  Small
Nations in New York14 also began to fuel ideas
about  a  new  world  order.15  In  1918,  the
dissemination  of  US  President  Woodrow
Wilson’s  Fourteen  Points  address  advocating
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each  nation’s  right  to  self-determination
(among  other  things)  gave  many  Koreans  a
strong  sense  of  hope  about  the  prospect  of
repudiating  Japanese  rule  and  reinstating
Korean  sovereignty.16  But  early  in  1919,
tensions  between  Koreans  and  the  Japanese
authorities escalated following the news of the
death of Korea’s last monarch, Emperor Kojong
(1852–1919), in the early hours of 21 January.
Rumors began to circulate suggesting that his
death  was  suspicious,  and  wall  posters
appeared  throughout  Seoul  proclaiming  that
the emperor had been deliberately poisoned by
the  Japanese  regime.17  One news publication
noted just days before the protests broke out
that “It is not surprising that the death of the
former Emperor of Korea should have aroused
feelings of regret in the minds of the Koreans
for their vanquished independence.”18
As  200,000  Koreans  from  throughout  the
country  descended  on  Seoul  to  witness
Emperor  Kojong’s  funeral  procession  on  3
March,  a  group  of  thirty-three  religious  and
cultural  leaders  who  had  drafted  a  Korean
Declaration of Independence decided that the
mass influx of people into the city presented a
propitious  opportunity  to  mount  peaceful
independence protests.  On the morning of  1
March,  the  group  met  at  a  restaurant  in
downtown  Seoul  to  sign  and  endorse  the
declaration  before  delivering  it  to  the
Government-General. Co-authored by historian
Ch’oe  Namsŏn  崔南善  (penname  Yuktang,
1890–1957)  and  poet  Han  Yongun  韓龍雲
(penname Manhae, 1879–1944), the declaration
adopted Wilsonian language to proclaim “the
independence of Korea and the liberty of the
Korean  people,”19  and  demanded  that  the
Japanese  regime  withdraw  immediately  from
the peninsula.20
The text  was  a  more  moderate  version  of  a
document  prepared  by  a  group  of  Korean
university students and intellectuals in Tokyo in
January 1919—which had been dispatched to
Japanese  politicians,  scholars,  news  outlets,
and  Woodrow Wilson  himself—promising  “an
eternal war of blood upon the Japanese” if their
demands were not met.21 It was hoped that this
document  would  simultaneously  incite
resistance  to  the  Japanese  colonizers  among
Koreans  and  garner  support  for  Korean
independence in the international community.22
Approximately 3,000 copies of the declaration
were  distributed  throughout  Seoul  that
morning.  In  response,  tens  of  thousands  of
Korean citizens from all  walks of life poured
into the streets waving the Korean flag, singing
the  national  anthem,  and  shouting  Taehan
Tongn ip  Manse i  (Long  l i ve  Korean
independence)!  At two o’clock, the protestors
gathered  at  T’apkol  Kongwŏn  (T’apkol  Park,
formerly Pagoda Park) to hear the declaration
read publicly by the independence activist Son
Pyŏng-hŭi  孫秉熙(1861–1922).23  It  advocated
non-violent demonstrations that would appeal
to the international community for assistance in
Korea’s bid to reclaim its freedom.24
Bronze relief in T’apkol Park depicting the
public  reading  of  the  Declaration  of
Independence  on  1  March,  1919,  Seoul
(photograph by author, 2016)
The Seoul  protest  incited another 1,500 pro-
independence demonstrations attended by over
a  million  Koreans,  in  all  but  seven  of  the
country’s  218  administrative  districts.  This
 APJ | JF 17 | 16 | 1
5
mass mobilization was fuelled predominantly by
word  of  mouth,  since  Japanese  censorship
prevented the communication of news or ideas
not supported by the state.25 Caught off guard
at the unprecedented scale of the protests, the
authorities ordered extra garrison forces from
Japan,  and  launched  a  campaign  of  violent
responses  which  included  firing  on  unarmed
crowds,  razing  villages,  and  conducting
extrajudicial killings of anti-colonial protestors
at the infamous Sŏdaemun Prison.26
Such flagrant acts of state violence only served
to  intensify  the  Koreans’  commitment  to
regaining  their  sovereignty,  and  resulted  in
new forms of resistance such as acts of passive
disobedience. Outspoken activists were forced
underground,  or  to  agitate  for  reform  in
diasporic Korean communities. The inability to
establish an official movement in the colony led
Koreans living in Shanghai to announce in April
1919  the  formation  of  the  Provisional
Government  of  the  Republic  of  Korea  with
Syngman  Rhee  李承晩  (1875–1965)  as  its
president in absentia. Rhee, who at that time
living  in  the  United  States,  attempted
unsuccessfully  to  attend the Versailles  Peace
Conference in order to petition US President
Wilson in person for Korea’s independence. At
the  end  of  World  War  II,  the  Provisional
Government in Shanghai provided leadership in
Korea, with Rhee assuming the role as its first
president.27
The movement was finally  suppressed in the
spring  of  1920,  but  during  the  “year  of
blood”28  thousands  of  Korean  nationals  were
killed  by  the  Japanese  gendarmerie  and
military forces, and many more were injured or
jailed.  The  Japanese  forces  also  suffered  a
number  of  deaths,  and  over  one  hundred
wounded.29 Yet even as images of the clashes
between  demonstrators  and  the  authorities
appeared in news sources around the world, no
nation  stepped  forward  to  challenge  Japan’s
authority in the peninsula.30 Japan had emerged
victorious  from  the  first  Sino-Japanese  War
(1894–1895),  the  Russo-Japanese  War
(1904–1905),  and  successfully  concluded  an
alliance with the Entente Powers in World War
I.  As  a  result  its  “sphere  of  influence”  was
rapidly gaining recognition. In particular, the
defeat  of  Russia  was  viewed  by  many  as  a
dismantling of European claims to a superior
civilization  which  dominated  international
affairs.31
Bronze  reliefs  (details)  depicting  the
Japanese  response  to  Korean  protestors
(photographs by author, 2016)
Meanwhile,  in Taishō (1912–1926) Japan, the
Sam-il Movement prompted many Japanese to
scrutinize Korea’s place in the empire for the
first  time  since  the  1910  annexation.  As
polarized opinions about the empire’s actions in
Korea emerged, writers supportive of Japan’s
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colonial expansionism and Korea’s colonization
were widely propagated in the popular press.
Many  Japanese  and  colonial-sponsored
newspapers in Korea ran articles, for instance,
that  ignored  any  Japanese  culpability  in  the
protests,  blaming instead the “insubordinate”
behavior of Koreans and Western missionaries
for the ongoing crisis.32 At the same time, the
prevailing spirit of Taishō democracy created a
climate  for  the  dissemination  of  a  range  of
ideas—including some that ran counter to state
objectives—which  lasted  until  the  1930s.
Criticism  of  Japan’s  colonial  policies  was,
however,  typically  subject  to  the  types  of
heavy-handed  censorship  inherited  from  the
Meiji  (1868–1912)  government’s  program  to
curtail  the  spread  of  “dangerous  thought”
(kiken  shisō),  which  included  redaction,
deliberate  blurring  of  type,  or  outright
prohibition.  Although  the  official  publishing
guidelines of the era remain unclear,  writers
were aware that the censorship division of the
Home Ministry’s  Police Bureau was the final
arbiter  of  what  was  made  available  in  the
public domain, and as a result, many adopted
tactics of voluntary self-censorship. Those who
transgressed  the  boundaries  were  issued
warnings, and in cases where censorship alone
was  considered  insufficient,  punishment  for
infractions  ranged  from  fines  to  prison
sentences.33
Yanagi’s  public  articulation  of  his  growing
unease at Japan’s dealings in Korea outweighed
any  concerns  he  may  have  held  regarding
censorship.  The Sam-il  protests catalyzed his
decision  to  begin  voicing  his  strenuous
objections to Japan’s colonial presence in the
peninsula  in  more  than  a  dozen  essays
published from May 1919 until  around 1923.
When the protests broke out, Yanagi was yet to
count any Korean nationals among his circle of
friends, but he quickly acquired many Korean
adm i r e r s  w i t h i n  a n d  w i t h o u t  t h e
colony.34  Although  Yanagi  never  learned  to
communicate in Korean, the Asakawa brothers
(particularly  Takumi)  served  as  interpreters
and cultural intermediaries on his many trips to
the peninsula, and he later formed friendships
with  Korean  intellectuals  including  the
independence reformist Yŏm Sang-sŏp 廉想渉
(penname  Hoengbo,  1897–1963).  Yanagi’s
qualification to act as a spokesperson for the
silenced  Koreans,  he  maintained,  was  his
sympathy  and  appreciation  of  “their  inner
desires which are manifested in their arts.”35
Yanagi’s first Korea essay, “Chōsenjin o omou”
(Thinking  of  the  Koreans),  was  serialized  in
Yomiuri Shinbun 20 to 24 May, 1919, just two
months  after  the  advent  of  the  March  First
Movement.  The  essay  was  translated  into
English and Hangŭl before publication in The
Japan Advertiser (13 August) and Tong-A Ilbo
(East Asia Daily, 12 April, 1920) respectively. In
this work, Yanagi articulated his affection for
the  Korean  people  and  Korean  beauty,  and
began  defining  a  role  for  himself  as  an
advocate  for  the  Koreans,  who  were  denied
freedom  of  speech  under  Japan’s  colonial
policies.  For  example,  he  openly  criticized
assimilationism,  which  included such policies
as teaching all school classes in the Japanese
language. “We are even trying to change the
way Koreans think,” Yanagi complained. “We
teach them Japanese morals and the graces of
the  imperial  family,  which  have  nothing
whatsoever to do with them.”36  He recounted
the “strange emotion” he felt upon viewing an
embroidery on display at a Korean girls’ school,
and his dismay at hearing that the students had
been  taught  to  embroider  in  the  Japanese
method. According to their (Japanese) teacher,
the embroidery was an outstanding example of
how easy it was to assimilate the “benefits” of
civilization,  but  Yanagi  found  it  a  “half-
Westernized, tasteless and inelegant work, with
unattractive  designs  and  shallow  coloring.”
This experience,  Yanagi explained, made him
“sad  at  the  loss  of  Korea,  which  is  rapidly
losing its characteristic beauty” because it was
“forced  to  participate  in  [Japan’s]  flawed
education.”37
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The independence protests also encouraged a
number of other Japanese public intellectuals
to  step  forward  to  call  for  action  on  the
growing  “Japan-Korea  problem”  (Nissen
mondai). One of the most influential minds of
the era, the liberal political thinker and Tokyo
Imperial  University professor Yoshino Sakuzō
吉野作造  (1878–1933),  generally  viewed
colonialism as a noble venture but described
the  independence  crisis  as  a  “humanitarian
problem”  that  required  the  immediate
abandonment  of  discriminatory  treatment
towards the Koreans. In an article published in
April  1919,  Yoshino  also  criticized  Japanese
assimilationism, and attributed Japan’s failure
as  a  colonizing  nation  to  a  lack  of  “self-
reflection”  ( j iko  hansei).  In  the  essay
“Liberalism  in  Japan,”  published  in  English,
Yoshino again called for an end to assimilation,
and assured his  readers  that  if  the  issue  of
Korea’s independence were put to his students,
ninety  percent  would  rally  for  Korea’s
autonomy.38
Another  leading  Taishō  intellectual,  the
journalist  and  political  economist  Ishibashi
Tanzan 石橋湛山 (1884–1973), was a champion
of “Small Japanism” (shō Nihon shugi) which
argued  fo r  con ta inment  o f  J apan ’ s
expansionism  due  to  the  excessive  costs
associated  with  running  the  colonies.  He
envisioned Korea’s self-determination as part of
a  new,  liberal  global  order  based  on  open
international markets,  cultural  exchange, and
restraint in the use of military force. For this
reason,  he  welcomed  the  March  First
Movement, thinking that it signified the demise
of  Japanese  rule  in  Korea  and  Japan’s
maltreatment  of  the Koreans as  though they
were “dogs and horses.”39  Similarly,  the left-
leaning Nishio  Suehiro  西尾末広  (1891–1981)
pronounced  Korea’s  colonization  an  abysmal
failure,  describing  the  forced  assimilation  of
the Koreans “as futile as attempts to extinguish
a  raging  fire  with  an  old-fashioned  hand-
pump.”40
Criticism of Korea’s colonial governance was by
no  means  confined  to  the  left,  however,  as
entities  such  as  Kokuryūkai  黒竜会  (Black
Dragon  Society)—a  right-wing  expansionist
group formed in 1901 by Uchida Ryōhei 内田良
平 (1874–1937)—also stepped forward to make
their  views  known.  Kokuryūkai  advocated  a
pan-Asianist  (han-Ajia  shugi)  approach  to
international  relations  that  would  shore  up
regional integration and cooperation and help
legitimize Japan’s  imperial  ambitions in Asia.
Following  the  March  First  protests,  Uchida
openly condemned the colonial administration’s
policy of integrating Koreans into the empire as
shinmin  (subjects  of  the  emperor)  without
affording them the same constitutional rights
as  Japanese  nationals.  While  opposed  to
granting  the  Koreans  outright  independence,
he argued that  a  program of  “domestic  self-
governance” could help advance stability in the
region.41
Like  these  other  outspoken commentators  of
the  era,  Yanagi’s  opposition  to  Korea’s
colonization  was  rooted  in  a  worldview  that
was at once liberal and cosmopolitan. His ideas
for a broader vision of a new and modern Asia
relied on Japan’s place in a progressive global
order.  Colonization  had  no  place  in  this
Tolstoian vision, and through his writings and
public lectures, he made his views known to the
colonial administration. “The thoughts of those
who do have experience with and knowledge of
Korea are primarily lacking in wisdom, depth,
and warmth,” Yanagi complained. “This makes
me cry often for the Koreans.” He attempted to
reassure the Koreans, however, that “some of
us  [Japanese]  are  cognizant  of  our  country’s
fai lure  to  fo l low  the  r ightful  path  to
humanity.”42  Yanagi’s  method in  many of  his
essays  on  Korea  was  to  draw  attention  to
Japan’s unlawful occupation of Korea and his
empathy  for  the  Koreans  through  the
mobilization  of  Korean  visual  cultures  as
vehicles to facilitate a path to rapprochement
between the two countries. “I believe it is art,
not science, that connects countries, and brings
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humans  closer  together,”  he  declared.  “Only
artistic  and  religious  understanding  can
appreciate the experiences of the inner heart,
and generate an infinite love.”43
In 1920, the publication of “Chōsen no tomo ni
okuru sho” (A Letter to My Korean Friends),
continued  Yanagi’s  campaign  of  denouncing
Japan’s  presence  in  Korea  by  pointedly
highlighting  the  moral  and  ethical  dilemmas
arising from its forced assimilation policies:
The governors are attempting to assimilate you.
But how is it that we who are so imperfect have
the authority to do so? There is no position as
unna tu r a l  a s  t h i s ,  a nd  t he r e  i s  n o
administration as lacking in authority. To insist
on assimilation only engenders opposition. You
must  dismiss  Japanization…  Korea’s  unique
beauty and freedom of the heart must not be
violated by other things. It is clear that these
things  cannot  be  violated  forever.  Real
cooperation  is  not  born  of  assimilation;  only
mutual respect between individuals will bring
about union.44
Yanagi’s bravery in speaking out in unequivocal
terms  in  spite  of  the  climate  of  elevated
surveillance and suppression of free speech is
characteristic of his conscientious responses to
the injustices  he encountered throughout  his
career. In 1922, his mounting frustration with
Japan’s staunch control of the peninsula and his
sympathy  for  the  Koreans  at tracted
considerable attention, as he openly described
Japan’s annexation of the peninsula in another
text as “a morally unforgivable act.”45 Then, in
August, he released an impassioned protest in
the essay  “Ushinawaren to  suru ichi  Chōsen
kenchiku  no  tame  ni”  (The  Historic  Korean
Monument  Slated  for  Demolition)  criticizing
the  colonial  government’s  plans  to  demolish
Seoul’s Kwanghwamun Gate in order to make
way  for  the  imposing  Western-style  Capitol
building that would serve as the Government-
General’s new headquarters.
Kwanghwamun Gate was a wooden structure
with a stone base fronting the most revered of
Korea’s  Five  Grand  Palaces,  Kyŏngbokkung.
The gate was a cherished symbol  of  Korea’s
enduring nationhood, initially erected in 1394
at  the  behest  of  the  new  Chosŏn  dynasty’s
founder,  Yi  Sŏng-gye  李成桂  (1335–1408).
Following its destruction by Japanese invaders
in the late sixteenth century, it lay in ruins for
two and a half centuries before it was rebuilt in
1867  using  public  donations.46  Yanagi
considered  the  gate  an  important  legacy  of
traditional East Asian art, which he viewed as
increasingly imperilled by the encroaching tide
of Western and Japanese modernity. The article
was serially  published from 24–28 August  in
Seoul’s moderately nationalist Tong-A Ilbo, and
then  as  the  lead  article  in  the  September
edition  of  the  Japanese  magazine  Kaizō
(Reform).47  It  was emotively styled in elegiac
prose which directly addressed the gate:
My  chest  is  tight  at  the  thought  of  your
suffering,  yet  there  is  nothing  I  can  do.
Everyone is hesitant to say anything. However,
for me, to bury you in silence would be such a
terrible tragedy. For this reason, I am taking
the place of those who cannot speak. On the
occasion of your death, I write this piece as a
final reminder to the world of your existence.
Sadly, I am separated from you by more than a
thousand miles. I fear that even in the act of
raising my voice amidst the silence that it is
impossible to save you from the unscrupulous
and powerful authorities.48
One Korean scholar described this essay as “an
unexpected  ambush  from  Tokyo”  that
constituted  “the  first  real  barrier  that  the
Government-General had encountered since the
annexation.”49  In  the  weeks  following  the
publication  of  this  essay,  which  “triggered
publ ic  outrage  across  Japan,” 5 0  the
Government-General bowed to public pressure
and  retracted  its  demolition  plans  for
Kwanghwamun,  much  to  the  “enormous
relief”51  of  many  observers.  The  gate  was
instead dismantled and erected nearby, only to
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be destroyed in the Korean War (1950–1953).52 
The reconstructed Kwanghwamun Gate,
Seoul (photograph by author, 2016)
While  some of  Yanagi’s  publications  brooked
little  or  no  scrutiny  from  the  censorship
bureau,  his  publication  of  such  openly
combative texts ensured that he garnered his
fair share of attention from the authorities. In
March 1920, two months before a planned trip
to  Korea,  Yanagi  submitted  “A Letter  to  My
Korean Friends” to the publisher Shinchōsha.
Entries in his diary dated 21–22 March indicate
that the essay was subsequently banned by the
censorship bureau, before an abridged Korean
translation run in Tong-A Ilbo in April was also
banned by the Government-General. The work
was finally released in the June issue of Kaizō,
but  it  was  subjected  to  such  heavy-handed
censorship that  when he saw it  for  the first
time Yanagi claimed that he barely recognized
it as his own.53 A Korean supporter confirmed
that it  was “often difficult  to understand the
meaning of [Yanagi’s] sentences because parts
[of his texts] were blacked out like wounds all
over a body.”54
Yanagi was never arrested or incarcerated, but
on a number of occasions he came dangerously
close.  For  example,  after  returning  from his
May 1920 trip, Yanagi was invited to speak at a
Korean  gathering.  As  he  prepared  to  go  on
stage,  he  was  discretely  warned  that  there
were several secret police in the audience, and
a stenographer, to record his every word. His
closest brush with the law coincided with the
release of the Kwanghwamun essay. After its
(censored)  publication,  Yanagi  was  officially
registered as  a  “dangerous person,”  and the
Special  Higher  Police  regularly  watched  his
r e s i dence ,  and  had  h im  t r a i l ed  by
detectives.55  Such  accounts  reflect  Yanagi’s
equanimity amidst the censorship climate, but
they  also  highlight  his  daring  in  exposing
himself to danger in the name of a higher moral
agenda. “I know that there are other Japanese
who feel as I do even though they have not said
as much publicly,” he wrote in 1920. “But I, for
one, do not wish to be cold regarding the fate
of Korea.”56
Although ultimately the Sam-il Movement failed
to  achieve  its  organizers’  aspirations  to
reinstate Korean sovereignty, it did eventually
garner  global  attention  and  convince  the
Government-General  to  review its  oppressive
first decade of governance in Korea. In August
1919,  Admiral  Saitō  Makoto  斎藤実  (g.
1919–1927 and 1929–1931) became Governor-
General, ushering in a more conciliatory era of
“cultural  rule”  (bunka  seiji).  Japanese
intellectuals such as Yoshino, Ishibashi, Nishio,
Uchida,  and  Yanagi—whose  views  differed
considerably  from  the  majority  of  public
commentators  championing  Japan’s  growing
presence  in  East  Asia  as  an  inevitable  and
providential aspect of Japan’s place in the new
world  order—must  have  gained  much
satisfaction  from  this  official  shift  in  policy,
even as it failed to reach the full level of its
promised implementation. Although the Korean
fight for sovereignty would not be realized for
decades, the movement may also have wielded
some  influence  on  China’s  May  Fourth
Movement, and similar nationalist protests in
India, the Philippines, Egypt, and Ireland.57
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Certainly,  the  traumatic  and  often  violent
events of the March First Movement marked a
turning  point  not  only  in  Korea’s  colonial
relationship  with  Japan,  but  also  among
Koreans  in  Korea,  Japan  and  beyond.  In
addition  to  highlighting  for  the  international
community  the  in just ices  of  Japan’s
expansionism,  the  movement  was  central  in
bolstering  solidarity  domestically,  and
consolidating the nationalist movement both in
Korea and abroad in its quest for liberation. In
the cultural realm, with the help of anti-colonial
campaigners such as Yanagi, it also indirectly
helped to secure the preservation of some of
Korea’s important cultural properties. Today, 1
March  is  commemorated  as  the  national
holiday Samil-chŏl in South Korea, and every
year  the  reading  of  the  Declaration  of
Independence  is  re-enacted  in  T’apkol
Park.58  Ten  large  murals  cast  in  bronze
encircling  the  participants  serve  not  only  as
symbolic  reminders  of  the  resistance  to
Japanese rule and the brutal suppression of the
movement,  but  also the heroic efforts  of  the
many individuals who mobilized their families
and  their  communities  in  the  national  and
t ransna t i ona l  s t rugg le  f o r  Korean
independence.
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